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In this paper we measure the relative efficiency of Portuguese local municipalities in a 
non-parametric framework approach using Data Envelopment Analysis. As an output 
measure we compute a composite local government output indicator of municipal 
performance. This allows assessing the extent of municipal spending that seems to be 
“wasted” relative to the “best-practice” frontier. Our results suggest that most 
municipalities could achieve, on average, the same level of output using fewer 
resources, improving performance without necessarily increasing municipal spending. 
Inefficiency scores are afterwards explained by means of a Tobit analysis with a set of 
relevant explanatory variables playing the role of non-discretionary inputs. 
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The relevance of local government’s spending has been increasing as the 
implementation of decentralised policies is being designed to refocus public decision-
making from central to municipal levels of government. Whether or not such local 
spending is done in an efficient manner is definitely an important issue. On the one 
hand, the degree to which the nature and organisation of the government leans toward a 
federal set up may depend on how efficient spending is perceived at the local level, 
notably in providing the best possible public local service at the lowest possible cost. 
On the other hand, and given the overall financial constraints faced by the governments 
in most European Union countries, public sector performance and efficiency should 
certainly be assessed as close as possible in order to provide some additional guidance 
for policy makers. Indeed, one can notice that growing attention is being given to the 
quality and efficiency of public spending in European countries, see, for instance, EC 
(2004). 
 
In this paper we evaluate and analyse public expenditure efficiency of Portuguese 
municipal governments. This is done by using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to 
compute input and output Farrell efficiency measures (efficiency scores) for all 278 
Portuguese municipalities located in the mainland for 2001. The analysis is performed 
by clustering municipalities into the five “regions” defined for statistical purposes 
according to the Portuguese nomenclature of territorial units with desegregation level II: 
Norte, Centro, Lisboa e Vale do Tejo (LVT), Alentejo and Algarve. This allows us to 
estimate the extent of municipal spending that is “wasteful” relative to the “best-
practice” frontiers. 
 
Our paper adds to the literature by supplying new evidence concerning the efficiency 
analysis of local government. Indeed, studies of local spending efficiency are still not 
abundant in the economic literature. Another contribution is the construction of a so-
called Local Government Output Indicator (LGOI), used as a composite output measure 





Understanding the possible relationships between the efficiency of local governments 
and the characteristics of municipal institutional and structural environment is of 
interest notably to local managers and policy makers. In fact, by giving insight into the 
causes of inefficiency, this helps to further identify the economic reasons for local 
inefficient behaviour and may support effective policy measures to correct and or 
control them. Therefore, the relevance of so-called non-discretionary inputs is also 
addressed in the paper through a Tobit analysis. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. In section two we provide some stylised facts about 
the institutional structure of the Portuguese local government sector and review some 
relevant literature on modelling local government production and measuring spending 
efficiency. In section three we briefly describe the DEA analytical framework. In 
section four we address data and measurement issues in order to construct our Local 
Government Output Indicator, and we present and discuss the empirical results of the 
non-parametric efficiency analysis. In section five we use a set of explanatory non-
discretionary inputs to explain the inefficiency scores. Section six concludes the paper. 
 
2. Motivation and literature 
 
2.1. Stylised facts for the Portuguese local government sector 
 
The institutional setting of the Portuguese local government sector was formally 
established in the 1976 Constitution, approved after the 1974 democratic revolution, and 
its budgetary framework relies on the application of public accounting principles.
1 
Accordingly, the Portuguese Public Sector is composed, on the one hand, by the 
administrative or general government sector, which encompasses those public 
authorities that develop state-specific economic activities through “non profit” criteria, 
and on the other hand, by the public enterprise sector, which refers to the activities, 
developed by those entities but exclusively through “economic” criteria (see Franco 
(2003)).
2 
                                                 
1  See Law 91/2001, republished by Law n.º 48/2004. 
2 Under the European System of National and Regional Accounting’s principles (ESA 95), the general 
government or Public Administration sector is composed by the following sub-sectors: “Central 





At the sub national level there are two tiers of government, regional and local, both 
resulting from decentralization processes but of distinct nature. The first tier results 
from a political process and includes the autonomous regions of Madeira and Azores. 
The second tier results from an administrative process, and includes the local 
authorities. Although the term “local authority” encompasses three kinds of local 
governments, which are administrative regions, municipalities and counties, only the 
last two do actually exist, since administrative regions were never created, despite their 
ongoing constitutional prevision since 1976. 
 
In Portugal there are currently 308 municipalities, 278 of which are located in Portugal 
mainland and the remaining 30 are overseas municipalities, belonging to the 
(politically) autonomous regions of Madeira and Azores. According to the Portuguese 
Constitution, local governments are territorially based organisations with administrative 
and fiscal autonomy, and with budgetary and patrimonial independence. The activity of 
the local governments should be fine-tuned to satisfy local needs and should be 
concerned with improving the well being of the population that live in their territories.  
 
Since 1976 – the year the first direct municipal elections took place – there has been an 
increasing devolution of powers from central to local governments, and the areas of 
intervention of municipalities have been gradually further extended. Accordingly, local 
governments should promote social and economic development, territory organisation, 
and supply local public goods such as water and sewage, transports, housing, 




According to the most recently approved local finances’ framework, Portuguese 
municipalities have their own budgets, with some budgeting principles and rules that are 
also common to those binding the central government budget.
4 As for the budgetary 
                                                 
3 Investment expenditure at the municipal level is divided in four broad categories: (1) acquisition of land, 
(2) housing, (3) other buildings (including sports, recreational and schooling infrastructures, social 
equipment and other), and (4) diverse constructions. This last category comprises the following items: 
overpasses, streets and complementary work; sewage; water pumping, treatment and distribution; rural 
roads; and infrastructures for solid waste treatment. 




process, in the end of each year the executive body of the municipality (town council) 
proposes to the legislative body (municipal assembly) the local budget and the plan of 
activities for the following year. 
 
Municipal authorities are also subject to several internal and external control 
mechanisms, the first being exercised by central government agencies and the later by 
an independent Court of Accounts.
5 These control mechanisms limit both access to 
revenue and expenditure choices. For instance, in what concerns revenue decisions, 
local governments borrowing is under control from central government, which has been 
intensified during the last years, mainly since 2002 for budget consolidation purposes. 
 
As for expenditures, which include notably transfers to the counties, compensation of 
employees related spending must not exceed 60 per cent of municipal current 
expenditures. In fact, these expenditures limit local governments’ margin of manoeuvre 
because they are regulated by rigid labour contracts. Employment duration and wage 
rates are both defined by the central government. As a result we may reasonably assume 
that there isn’t much labour-input price variability within Portuguese municipalities. For 
instance, the main municipal expenditure items in 2001 (with the exception of financial 
operations) were investment and compensation of employees, accounting respectively 
for about 44.3 and 25.6 per cent of total expenditures. 
 
As for the revenue components, although by law municipalities are financially 
autonomous, their main sources of revenue for 2001 came largely from transfers that 
accounted for 51.7 per cent of their total revenues, again not counting financial 
operations. On the other hand, municipal direct taxes accounted for 28.6 per cent of 
total revenues. 
 
In Table 1 we present some stylised facts for the local government sector for 2001, 
excluding the islands, grouped by five “regions” defined for statistical purposes 
according to the Portuguese nomenclature of territorial units with desegregation level II 
(NUTS II): Norte, Centro, Lisboa e Vale do Tejo (LVT), Alentejo and Algarve.
6 
                                                 
5 In what concerns external control, the results of audit actions may lead to judicial processes where 
public financial responsibility is scrutinised. 






Table 1 – Some stylised facts for the local government sector 
  






























Portugal *  278  88 785  100.00  9 869 343  111  100.00  795.40 
Alentejo  47  27 218  30.66  535 753  20  5.43  982.71 
Algarve  16  4 987  5.62  395 218  79  4.00  1128.78 
Centro  78  23 660  26.65  1 783 596  75  18.07  812.04 
LVT  51  11 643  13.11  3 467 483  298  35.13  683.40 
Norte  86  21 277  23.96  3 687 293  173  37.36  682.34 
Max  86  27 218  30.66  3 687 293  20  37.36  1128.71 
Min  16  4 987  5.62  395 218  298  4.00  682.34 
 
* Mainland. 
1/ “Finanças locais: aplicação em 2001”, DGAL, electronic edition at: 
http://www.dgaa.pt/publicacoes/financas_municipais/2001/FM_2001%20OK.pdf 
2/ INE, 2001, “Recenseamento Geral da População e Habitação – 2001” (Definitive Results).  
 
According to Table 1, Algarve was the region that had the highest average spending per 
capita, but in what concerns resident population, area and number of municipalities it 
always lags behind other regions. By contrast, and despite of having the highest 
percentage of total resident population in mainland Portugal, 37.4 per cent, and of 
having more municipalities than any of the other four regions, Norte has the lowest 
average spending per capita. As for the LVT region, with 51 municipalities, which 
include the country’s capital, and with an area amounting to only 13.1 per cent of 
mainland Portugal (the second lowest), its population accounts for 35.1 per cent of total 
population (the second highest), and it has the third highest average spending per capita. 
 
Our subsequent analysis of local government relative efficiency will use precisely 
information related to these 278 municipalities located in mainland Portugal. We also 
take into account possible differences within the aforementioned five regions defined 
for statistical purposes. 
 
2.2. Literature review 
 
The “traditional” approach to evaluate production efficiency uses both input and output 
quantitative indicators and information about their unit prices in order to study 




prices of outputs and inputs are the weights. However, one of the basic problems in 
evaluating public sector activities through this approach is that market prices for outputs 
are commonly unavailable given its not for profit nature. 
7   
 
In addition to evaluating “productivity” as described above it is also possible to apply 
frontier analysis to evaluate “technical efficiency” (see Farrell (1957)). Here, there are 
two options: firstly, to estimate parametrically an aggregate production function where 
multiple outputs have been weighted (e.g. by unit costs) into a single output; secondly, 
to estimate non-parametrically a production function frontier and derive efficiency 
scores on the basis of relative distances of inefficient observations from the frontier. The 
main advantage of this latter approach is that production function frontiers can be 
derived in a multiple outputs and multiple inputs setting without requiring the definition 
of weights. 
 
Following De Borger and Kerstens (2000), it is possible to identify two groups in local 
efficiency literature. On the one hand, there are studies that evaluate efficiency in a 
global way, covering all or at least several services provided by local governments. See, 
for instance, Vanden Eeckaut, Tulkens and Jamar (1993), De Borger et al. (1994), De 
Borger and Kerstens (1996a, b), Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998), Worthington 
(2000), Prieto and Zofio (2001), Balaguer-Coll, Prior-Jiménez and Vela-Bargues 
(2002), Afonso and Fernandes (2005) and Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005), among 
others. 
 
On the other hand, there are studies that evaluate a particular local service, as it is the 
case, for instance, of solid waste collection (Burgat and Jeanrenaud (1994)), fire 
protection (Bouckaert (1992)), local police units (Davis and Hayes (1993)) and general 
administration (Kalseth and Rattsø (1995)).  
 
In Table 2 we survey studies that evaluate both non-parametrically and globally local 
governments’ efficiency. We can conclude that studies applying frontier analysis to the 
                                                 
7 For instance, for the Norwegian local government sector, Borge, Falch and Tovmo (2004) overcame this 
problem by using national cost weights to aggregate the main outputs of each municipality into a single 
aggregate output. These outputs were then divided by aggregate resources (measured in revenues) to get a 





local government sector do not abound in the literature, mainly because of the difficulty 
in defining local outputs and/or in obtaining statistical information to quantify all or at 
least several of them.
8 
 
As non-discretionary and discretionary inputs jointly contribute to outputs, there are in 
the literature several proposals on how to deal with this issue, implying usually the use 
of two-stage and even three-stage models.
9 Some of the studies surveyed in Table 2 
obtain efficiency scores from DEA using only controllable local inputs and outputs in 
the first stage and regress the efficiency scores on the non-discretionary inputs in a 
second stage as reported in Table 3. 
 
The main purpose of these studies using regression models is to determine the impact of 
observable environmental variables on initial evaluation of local governments’ 
performance, providing a framework which allows non-discretionary inputs to feature in 
the explanation of differences in efficiency scores empirically estimated in the first 
stage. For instance, the results obtained by De Borger and Kerstens (1996a) and 
Balaguer-Coll, Prior-Jiménez and Vela-Bargues (2002) indicate that entities with higher 
tax revenues and/or those receiving higher grants are the most inefficient in the 













                                                 
8 For a literature review, see Worthington and Dollery (2000) and De Borger and Kerstens (2000). 




Table 2 - Studies that evaluate both non-parametrically and globally local governments’ 
efficiency  











(FDH - Free 





Total population; Share of age group with more 
than 65 years on total population; Number of 
subsistence beneficiaries; Number of students in 
primary school; Municipal roads’ surface; 
Number of local crimes. 








Number of blue 
and white-collar 
workers; space of 
buildings. 
Surface of roads; Number of minimal 
subsistence grant recipients; Students enrolled in 
primary schools; Surface of public recreational 
facilities; Proxy for services delivered to non-
residents defined as log(number of non-
residents)/log(total employment). 














Total population; Share of age group with more 
than 65 years on total population; Number of 
unemployment subsidy beneficiaries; Number of 















Number of resident families; Average residential 















Resident population; Homes with clean water; 
Homes with solid waste collection; illiterate 
population; Number of enrolled students in 





















Total population; Number of properties acquired 
to provide the following services: Potable water; 
Domestic waste collection; Surface of rural and 
urban roads (Km). 
 
 




from Castilla and 










Potable water; Domestic waste collection; Road 
surface area; Lighting street points; cultural and 














Number of lighting points; Total population; 
Tons of waste collected; Street infrastructure 
surface area; Registered surface area of public 
parks; Number of votes; “Quality” 











Total per capita 
expenditures 
Total municipal performance indicator 
composed by sub indicators grouped in the 
following dimensions: General administration; 
Education; Social services; Cultural services; 












Children’s day care centres (n. º of days); 
Children’s family day care (n. º of days); Open 
basic health care (n. º of visits); Dental care (n. º 
of visits); Bed wards in basic health care (n. º of 
visits); Institutional care of the elderly (n.º of 
days); Institutional care of the Handicapped (n.º 
of days); Comprehensive schools (hours of 
teaching); Senior secondary schools (hours of 





Table 3 – Studies that explain DEA efficiency scores with non-discretionary inputs 




Country  Positive impact on efficiency  Negative impact on efficiency 
Vanden Eeckaut, 




•  High local tax rates; 
•  Educational level of the adult 
population. 
•  Higher per capita incomes and 
wealth of citizens; 
•  Per capita block grant; 
•  Political characteristics (number of 
coalition parties). 




•  Local tax rates; 
•  Level of education. 
•  Per capita block grant;  






•  Largest populations; 
•  Level of commercial activity. 
•  Higher per capita tax revenue; 





•  High share of fees and 
charges in municipal income; 
•  High investment share in 
total expenditures; 
•  Population density; 
•  Grants; 







•  Big share of municipal 
workers in age group 35-49 
years; 
•  Dense urban structure; 
•  High education level of 
inhabitants. 
•  Peripheral location; 
•  High income level (high wages); 
•  Large population; 
•  High unemployment; 
•  Diverse service structure; 
•  Big share of services bought from 
other municipalities; 
•  A high share of costs covered by 
state grants reduced efficiency in 
first years after the end of 
matching grant era in 1993. 
 
The efficiency scores estimated by De Borger and Kerstens (1996a) under several 
reference technologies were also explained by regression methods and the results were 
surprisingly similar. The level of taxation and education level also seem to be positively 
related to technical efficiency. By contrast, average income level and the ratio of grants 
to revenue were found to be negatively related to efficiency.  
 
Additionally, Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998) concluded that the most efficient 
municipalities were those that have high tax bases, income levels and public investment 
share on total expenditures. It was also found that inefficiency was related to high 





Finally, Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005) mention that factors such as peripheral 
location,
10 large population, high levels of income and unemployment, and a big share 
of services bought from other municipalities are negatively related to spending 
municipal efficiency. By contrast, high share of municipal workers in the age group of 
35 to 49 years, narrow range of services, dense urban structure and high education level 
of population (proxy for education level of municipal workers in the basic service 
sectors) are factors that related positively to efficiency. A high share of state grants 
reduced efficiency, but after the 1997 reform leading to non-earmarked lump-sum 
grants, the grant variable was unrelated to efficiency. 
 
3. DEA framework 
 
We use the non-parametric method DEA, which was originally developed and applied 
to firms that convert inputs into outputs. Coelli, Rao and Battese (1998) and Sengupta 
(2000) introduce the reader to this literature and describe several applications.
11 The 
term “firm”, sometimes replaced by the more encompassing Decision Making Unit 
(henceforth DMUs), the term coined by Charnes et al. (1978), may include non-profit or 
public organisations, such as hospitals, universities or local authorities.  
 
Data Envelopment Analysis, originating from Farrell’s (1957) seminal work and 
popularised by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), assumes the existence of a convex 
production frontier. The production frontier in the DEA approach is constructed using 
linear programming methods. The terminology “envelopment” stems out from the fact 
that the production frontier envelops the set of observations.
12 
 
                                                 
10 This indicator was measured by the weighted average of road distances between the economic region of 
the municipality to all other domestic regions. In this measure pair-wise distances between regions are 
weighted with the Gross Regional Product of the destination region (cfr. Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005). 
11 A possible alternative non-parametric method would be Free Disposable Hull analysis (FDH). Deprins, 
Simar, and Tulkens (1984) first proposed the FDH analysis, which relaxes the convexity assumption 
maintained by the DEA model. 
12 Technical efficiency is one of the two components of total economic efficiency, also referred to as X-
efficiency. The second component is allocative efficiency and they are put together in the overall 
efficiency relation: economic efficiency = technical efficiency × allocative efficiency. A DMU is 
technically efficient if it is able to obtain maximum output from a set of given inputs (output-oriented) or 
is capable to minimise inputs to produce the same level of output (input-oriented). On the other hand, 
allocative efficiency reflects the DMUs ability to use the inputs in optimal proportions. Coelli et al. 
(1998) and Thanassoulis (2001) offer introductions to DEA, while Simar and Wilson (2003) and Murillo-




The general relationship that we expect to test regarding efficiency can be given by the 
following function for each municipality i: 
 
  ) ( i i X f Y = , i=1,…,n   (1) 
 
where we have Yi – indicators reflecting output measures; Xi – spending or other 
relevant inputs in municipality i, either per inhabitant or in some other measure. 
If ) ( i i x f Y < , it is said that municipality i exhibits inefficiency. For the observed input 
level, the actual output is smaller than the best attainable one and inefficiency can then 
be measured by computing the distance to the theoretical efficiency frontier.  
 
The purpose of an input-oriented example is to study by how much input quantities can 
be proportionally reduced without changing the output quantities produced. 
Alternatively, and by computing output-oriented measures, one could also try to assess 
how much output quantities can be proportionally increased without changing the input 
quantities used. The two measures provide the same results under constant returns to 
scale but give different values under variable returns to scale. Nevertheless, and since 
the computation uses linear programming, not subject to statistical problems such as 
simultaneous equation bias and specification errors, both output and input-oriented 
models will identify the same set of efficient/inefficient producers or DMUs.
13 
 
The analytical description of the linear programming problem to be solved, in the 
variable-returns to scale hypothesis, is sketched below for an input-oriented 
specification. Suppose there are k inputs and m outputs for n DMUs. For the i-th DMU, 
yi is the column vector of the inputs and xi is the column vector of the outputs. We can 
also define X as the (k×n) input matrix and Y as the (m×n) output matrix. The DEA 
model is then specified with the following mathematical programming problem, for a 
given i-th DMU: 
14 
 
                                                 
13 In fact, and as mentioned namely by Coelli, Rao and Battese (1998), the choice between input and 
output orientations is not crucial since only the two measures associated with the inefficient units may be 
different between the two methodologies. 
14 We simply present here the equivalent envelopment form, derived by Charnes Charnes, Cooper and  







         1 ' 1
0           
0      to s.
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In problem (2), θ is a scalar (that satisfies θ≤1), more specifically it is the efficiency 
score that measures technical efficiency. It measures the distance between a 
municipality and the efficiency frontier, defined as a linear combination of the best 
practice observations. With θ<1, the municipality is inside the frontier (i.e. it is 
inefficient), while θ=1 implies that the municipality is on the frontier (i.e. it is efficient). 
 
The vector λ is a (n×1) vector of constants that measures the weights used to compute 
the location of an inefficient DMU if it were to become efficient. The inefficient DMU 
would be projected on the production frontier as a linear combination of those weights, 
related to the peers of the inefficient DMU. The peers are other DMUs that are more 
efficient and therefore are used as references for the inefficient DMU.  1 n  is a n-
dimensional vector of ones. The restriction  1 ' 1 = λ n  imposes convexity of the frontier, 
accounting for variable returns to scale. Dropping this restriction would amount to 
admit that returns to scale were constant. Notice that problem (1) has to be solved for 
each of the n DMUs in order to obtain the n efficiency scores. 
 




In our analysis we assess the relative efficiency of individual Portuguese municipalities 
for 2001, within each of the aforementioned five “regions” defined according to the 
Portuguese nomenclature of territorial units with desegregation level II (NUTS II): 
Norte, Centro, Lisboa e Vale do Tejo (LVT), Alentejo and Algarve. The municipalities 
located in the Madeira and Azores islands were not included because their specific 





To use the DEA methodology, in order to derive efficiency measures, we need data on 
municipal inputs and outputs. As for the former, no measures on local production 
factors (such as labour or capital) used by local governments were available. To 
overcome this problem, we selected per capita municipal expenditures registered on 
municipal accounts for the year 2001 as a measure of the municipal resources used in 
local services’ provision. Input data for year 2001 were taken from the annual 
publication  Municipal Finances:  Application edited by the Portuguese Directorate-
General of Local Governments. 
 
Therefore, we are able to measure municipal spending efficiency (see Clements (2002)), 
not distinguishing technical from allocative efficiency. However, as the measurement of 
the latter requires price information, while the former only requires quantity data 
(Lovell (2000)), selecting per capita municipal spending gives us at least the guarantee 
that all inputs will be considered in our analysis (De Borger and Kerstens (2000)). 
Additionally, this variable is a more realistic municipal input measure if we 
acknowledge the reduced margin of manoeuvre that municipal authorities have to 
influence current expenditure choices, notably those concerning the compensation of 
employees. 
 
As for municipal outputs, we use statistical information published in 2003 by the 
National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estatística) to construct a 
composite local government output indicator that tries to globally assess the several 
areas of municipal provision of services and goods. We explain in the next sub-section 
the construction of such output indicator. 
 
4.2. Local Government Output Indicator (LGOI) 
 
We focus on global municipal performance stemming from the municipal provision of 
several local services. However, as we were confronted with the difficulty of directly 
measuring some of the municipal production results, we concentrate on more 
homogenous basic local activities taking into account those spending functions 
enumerated in legal municipal government framework: rural and urban equipment, 




and leisure, healthcare, social services, housing, protection of the civil population, 
environment and basic sanitation, consumer protection, promote social and economic 
development, territory organisation, and external cooperation. Furthermore, some of the 
municipal performance indicators are surrogate measures of municipal services demand. 
 
The selection of indicators was based upon two general arguments implied within our 
analysis.  First, municipalities with similar demand for homogeneous services should 
also have similar performance. Accordingly, we expect that a municipality with a 
younger population will allocate more public resources for the satisfaction of this 
particular group in terms, for example, of education and sportive services provision. 
Second, performance of municipal governments can be measured in terms of the 
improvement of observable factors directly controlled by municipal governments during 
the time period under consideration (see Lovell (1993)).   
 
We present in Table 4 the selected output indicators (Yi) used to quantitatively proxy 
the results of individual municipal services provision (sources are provided in the 
Annex). 
 
Table 4 – Selected municipal services indicators (Yi) 
Variable Municipal  Services  Indicators 
Y1 
 
Social services  
 
- Local inhabitants with  ≥ 65 years old, in percentage of the 
total resident population, 2001. 
Y2  Education  - School  buildings per capita measured by the number of 
nursery and primary school buildings in percent of the total 
number of corresponding school-age inhabitants (Y21), 2001; 
- Gross primary enrolment ratio, the number of enrolled 
students in nursery and primary education in percent of the 
total number of corresponding school age inhabitants (Y22), 
2001. 
Y3  Cultural services  - Number of library users in percentage of the total resident 
population, 2001. 
Y4  Sanitation  - Water supply, 1000 m
3 (Y41); 
- Solid waste collection, tons (Y42). 
Y5  Territory organisation  - The number of licences for building construction, 2001. 
Y6  Road  infrastructures    - The length of roads maintained by the municipalities per 
number of the total resident population, 1998. 
 
Table 5 reports the regional average values for the selected municipal services 




Portuguese municipalities, mainly for cultural, sanitation and territory organisation 
services provision.  
 
On average, municipalities located in the LVT region score well in sanitation and 
territory organisation service provision. By contrast, they have the lowest performance 
in basic education. As for infrastructure, municipalities of both LVT and Norte regions 
have the lowest scores. Therefore, since these regions siege the two main Portuguese 
cities – Lisbon (the capital) and Porto –, the measure of road infrastructure doesn’t 
apply in both cases because the administrative division of those cities matches the 
respective municipalities boundaries, which only include a single urban territory. From 
Table 5 it is possible to see that those municipalities belonging to Alentejo and Algarve 
regions seem to have a good performance in social and cultural services provision.  
 
Table 5 – Regional average values for municipal result indicators (2001) 
Basic Education 



























Alentejo 0.257  0.023  0.626  1.149 1005.26 5639.66  83.26  0.020 
Algarve 0.217  0.012  0.570  1.203 4280.19  18428.31 251.19  0.027 
Centro   0.233  0.030  0.624  0.944  1864.24  8137.29  175.28  0.023 
LVT 0.180  0.014  0.535  1.157  7811.96  36114.49 270.00  0.011 
Norte   0.182  0.029  0.621  0.896  2708.06  18125.03 235.51  0.018 
Min 0.180  0.012  0.535  0.896  1005.26  5639.66  83.26  0.011 
Max 0.257  0.030  0.626  1.203  7811.96  36114.49 270.00  0.027 
 
As suggested by several authors, we quantify the so-called Local Government Output 
Indicator (LGOI) as a single measure of municipal performance having in mind two 
objectives: on the one hand, to evaluate globally municipal performance; on the other 
hand, to carry with a frontier approach to local efficiency using that composite indicator 
as our output measure.
15 
 
The procedure adopted to construct the composite indicator for each region was as 
follows: first, all values of each sub-indicator mentioned in Table 4 were normalised by 
setting the average equal to one. Then, we compiled the performance indicator from the 
                                                 




various sub-indicators giving equal weight to each of them. The summary values of our 
output measure, LGOI, observed within each of the five regions are reported in Table 6. 
These values refer to simple averages observed in the individual municipal results in 
each of the five regions considered in this study. The detailed set of results for our 
LGOI construction is presented in Appendix 1. 
 
Table 6 – Regional summary values for LGOI - 2001 
   Alentejo Algarve  Centro  LVT  Norte 
Average  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 
Minimum  0.61 0.65 0.58 0.50  0.43 
(municipality) (Portel) (Tavira)  (Belmonte)  (Azambuja)  (Trofa) 
Maximum  1.73 1.65 2.92 3.49  3.44 
(municipality) (C.Vide)  (Monchique) (Coimbra)  (Lisboa)  (Porto) 
Stdev  0.26 0.30 0.44 0.49  0.47 
 
Table 6 suggests large differences in municipal services provision performance within 
and across regions. Particularly, LVT, Centro and Norte regions show the highest 
standard deviation. These three regions are also those that on average spent less in 2001 
in per capita terms (683.4, 812.04 and 682.34 euros respectively, as seen before in Table 
1). By contrast, Algarve and Alentejo regions, although being less heterogeneous 
regions in terms of the LGOI, were the ones with the highest average spending per 
capita in 2001 (1128.78 and 982.71 euros respectively). 
 
4.3. DEA results 
 
In order to evaluate non-parametrically the efficiency in municipal provision on local 
services, we will use the LGOI as the output measure, and the level of per capita 
municipal spending as the input measure.  
 
Table 7 summarizes our DEA results obtained with the one input, and one output, in all 
municipalities located within the five mainland regions, both in terms of input and 
output oriented efficiency scores for 2001. The individual and complete DEA results, 
for every municipality in each of the five regions, are presented in Appendix 2. We also 
report the DEA results regarding the entire set of municipalities in mainland Portugal, 




input and one output analysis; secondly, using instead of the aggregate LGOI measure 
its six sub-indicators as separate outputs.  
 
Table 7 – DEA efficiency results 
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3.9 0.237  0.353 0.017 


























Min  16  2  2.6 0.232  0.353 0.017  0.182 
























Notes: The Mainland 2 DEA set of results was obtained using a one input and six outputs approach, 
where the several sub-indicators of the composite LGOI were used separately as outputs. 
(a) The detailed DEA results for these two additional set of calculations, even if not presented here for 
space reasons, are available from the authors upon request. 
(b) We excluded the municipalities for which data wasn’t available for at least one sub-indicator. 
Municipalities excluded for this reason were the following ones: Trofa, Porto, Ourique, Vizela, Marvão, 
Castro Marim, Murtosa, Odivelas and Lisboa. 
(c) The twenty eight municipalities declared DEA efficient were the following ones: Alfândega da Fé, 
Aveiro, Boticas, Castro Daire, Coruche, Figueira da Foz, Idanha-a-Nova, Leiria, Mação, Mafra, Oliveira 
do Bairro, Paredes de Coura, Pedrógão Grande, Penalva do Castelo, Penamacor, Proença-a-Nova, 
Resende, Sabugal, São João da Madeira, Sardoal, Sintra, Torre de Moncorvo, Vila de Rei, Vila Nova de 
Cerveira, Vila Nova de Famalicão, Vila Real, Vila Velha de Ródão, Vinhais. 
 
From Table 7 it is possible to see that the highest share of municipalities that would be 
labelled as most efficient and located on the theoretical production frontier within a 




Cacém, Évora, Castelo de Vide and Portalegre). However, one has to bear in mind that 
these two regions are also the ones with the lower number of municipalities. 
 
In what concerns the Norte region, which has the highest number of municipalities, only 
four municipalities (Braga, Vizela, Gondomar and Porto) were labelled as most efficient 
and located on the theoretical production frontier. 
 
Interestingly for LVT region, the efficiency results confirm those obtained in Afonso 
and Fernandes (2005) in what concerns both the identification of the efficient 
municipalities (Lisbon, Caldas da Rainha and Sintra) and the input average efficiency 
score (around 0.6). 
 
By comparing the averages of input efficiency scores observed within each of the five 
regions, we conclude that Alentejo (0.654) and Algarve (0.608) have the highest values, 
suggesting that their municipalities could theoretically achieve on average roughly the 
same level of local output with about 35.5 and 39.2 per cent fewer resources, 
respectively.  
 
By contrast, municipalities belonging to Centro are reported in Table 7 as being the 
least efficient (0.232), implying that these municipalities could theoretically achieve on 
average roughly the same level of local output with about 76.8 per cent fewer resources, 
i.e., that local performance could be strongly improved without necessarily increasing 
municipal spending. Interestingly, it was also in this region that we observed both the 
lowest (128,37 euros for Figueira da Foz) and the highest (7683,33 euros for Figueira de 
Castelo Rodrigo) values for the selected input measure.   
 
Considering the entire set of municipalities in mainland Portugal, we can compare the 
DEA results obtained using, on one hand, for each of the five regions, a one input and 
one output analysis (which we called “Mainland”), with those obtained using, on the 
other hand, a one input and six outputs specification, where the several sub-indicators of 
the composite LGOI were used separately (which we called “Mainland 2”). We may 
conclude that, as expected, the higher the number of factors included in the analysis 





16 Indeed, the number of efficient municipalities and the average efficiency 
scores are both higher in Mainland 2 compared to Mainland DEA set of results. 
 
5. Explaining inefficiency 
 
5.1. Non-discretionary factors 
 
One has to assume that some municipalities are unable to achieve the “best-practice” 
due to a relative harsh environment. Therefore, there is an interest in explaining the 
distribution of the efficiency scores previously calculated in the first-stage of our 
empirical analysis in light of local socio-economic and demographic specificities, as 
maintained, for example, by Bradford, Malt and Oates (1969), Schwab and Oates 
(1991), essentially mainly to help guiding public policy and assist municipal decision-
making process. 
 
Indeed, the standard DEA model as the one described in (1) incorporates only 
discretionary inputs, those whose quantities can be changed at the DMU will, and does 
not take into account the presence of environmental variables or factors, also known as 
non-discretionary inputs. However, socio-economic differences may play a relevant role 
in determining heterogeneity across the municipalities and influence performance 
outcomes. These exogenous socio-economic factors can include, for instance, the level 
of education of the population in a given region, the municipality’s purchasing power or 
even its geographical distance to the main decision centres.  
 
In this sub-section our purpose is to empirically examine how the DEA efficiency 
results may be associated to, and thereby explained by, hypothesized factors proposed 
in the literature on local government sector efficiency. These factors can be broadly 
                                                 
16 These results support Banker et al. (1989) and Nunamaker (1985) argument that the number of DEA 
efficient DMUs varies positively as long as the difference between the number of observations and the 
number of variables increases. Pedraja-Chaparro et al. (1999) also affirm that “(...) other things being 
equal, a larger number of DMUs reduces the problem of data sparsity and increases the probability that 
the sample will include relatively efficient DMUs with which a poorly performing DMU can be 
compared”. As for the number of factors, these authors refer that “(...) other things being equal, as the 





identified under two main categories: inter-municipal competition and socioeconomic 
and demographic characteristics. 
 
Regarding inter-municipal competition, for instance Tiebout (1956) and Heikkila (1996) 
argue that municipal inefficiency  may be associated with the lack off competition 
pressures one municipality feels from other competing municipalities. This can arise 
because those competing forces can be related with the degree of choice mobile 
citizens/consumers do have to move into communities that offer a bundle of services 
that best match their own preferences.
17 In fact, Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005) found 
that peripheral location was negatively related to municipal spending efficiency. 
Following this trend, to approach these competitive forces we calculated the 
geographical distance between the municipality and its capital of district. This variable 
is expected to exert a negative effect on efficiency. 
 
Bureaucracy inefficiency models (see Niskanen (1975) and Migué and Bélanger (1974)) 
envisage monitoring as a pragmatic framework to avoid the hypothesized tendency of 
local governments to pursue self-interests and political agenda (see, for instance, 
Mueller (2003), Hayes and Wood (1995) and Hayes, Razzolini and Ross (1998)). It has 
become common practice on local sector analysis the introduction of socio-economic 
and demographic characteristics that might explain variations in the ability of local 
residents to properly monitor local governments. These “community composition” 
elements may explain inter-municipal differences in the production of local goods 
consumed by local residents.  
 
Although it is difficult to distinguish effects on demand from those determinants of 
inefficiencies, we may argue that efficiency may be affected by factors reflecting 
monitoring costs such as socio-economic factors. Indeed, the scope of “the disciplining 
                                                 
17  In fact, Hayes, Razzolini, and Ross (1998) and Grossman, Mavros and Wassmer (1999) findings 
support that intra-metropolitan suburban competition does positively contribute for the improvement of 
efficiency and it may be expected that metropolitan suburbs within closer proximity of each other 
enhance higher mobility choices than non-metropolitan municipalities, resulting from this “voting by 
feet” mechanism (Tiebout (1956)) higher pressures on local governments to be more efficient in the 
provision of local services. Additionally, Grossman, Mavros and Wassmer (1999)) argue that the more 
metropolitan suburban municipalities are perceived by mobile consumers as “effective substitutes” for 





effect of competition” (cfr. Grossman, Mavros and Wassmer (1999)) may be limited if 
monitoring the local government performance is difficult and costly due to, 
respectively, reduced ability of citizen-voters or the existence of opportunity costs to 
properly monitor local authorities (De Borger and Kerstens (1996a)).  
 
Hamilton (1983) and Hayes, Razzolini, and Ross (1998) argue that local efficiency may 
depend on the ability of citizens to pressure local representatives and more specifically, 
that monitoring municipal performance, and even costs, depends on the education level 
of local residents.
18 In what concerns spending efficiency, the findings of Vanden 
Eeckaut, Tulkens and Jamar (1993), De Borger and Kerstens (1996a) and Loikkanen 
and Susiluoto (2005) support the argument that efficiency is positively related to 
average level of education of local inhabitants. Therefore, we use two alternative 
measures of educational achievement: first, the percentage of population with secondary 
education; secondly, the percentage of population with tertiary education. We expect 
these variables to exert a positive effect in efficiency.
19 
 
To determine the impact of higher per capita incomes and wealth of citizens on 
spending efficiency we used the municipal per capita purchasing power, a per capita 
index estimated by the Portuguese National Institute of Statistics. The aim is then to 
assess whether richer local residents impose somehow an increased pressure in 
demanding more efficient local services. 
 
In what concerns demographic characteristics, Grossman, Mavros and Wassmer (1999)   
argue that monitoring costs are likely to vary positively with geographic ‘sparsity of 
                                                 
18 Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos (2004) analyse the beneficial outcomes deriving from educational 
attainment, exploring the potential positive externalities of education as “enhanced political behaviour”. 
They find that education is related to several measures of political interest and involvement in U.S and 
U.K. This effect was supposed to be exercised through the following channels: (i) the “quality” of 
participation of a given subset of citizens (as Hamilton (1983)); and (ii) enlarged participation among 
citizens (or, as is the same, as being negatively related with what Grossman, Mavros and Wassmer (1999) 
labelled as “rationale ignorance” and “rationale abstention”, respectively). According to Milligan, 
Moretti, Oreopoulos (2004), “The first channel is important if education equips citizens with the cognitive 
skills they need to be effective participants in a representative democracy. In this case, education 
increases citizen’s ability to select able leaders, understand the issues upon which they will vote, act as a 
check on the potential excess of the government, and recognize corruption in leaders”. 






municipalities’, which may indicate the presence of scale diseconomies. On the other 
hand, scale economies could exist when providing local public services for an enlarged 
number of residents, which would then increase its efficiency. We model this 
exogenous dimension by using population density variables and population growth. 
 
5.2. Tobit analysis 
 
Using the DEA output efficiency scores computed in the previous section, we now 
evaluate the importance of environmental or non-discretionary inputs. We present the 
results from Tobit estimations by regressing the output efficiency scores, δι, on a set of 
possible explanatory variables as as follows 
 
  i i i i i i Pop D E Y ε β β β β β δ + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0 ,   (3) 
 
where, Y is a measure of purchasing power at the municipality level, E is a measure of 
the educational level, D is a variable that captures the effect of the geographical distance 
between the municipality and its capital of district, and Pop is a population related 
indicator, for instance population density of population growth. 
 
For a more simple reading of the results vis-à-vis the efficiency scores, we use the 
inverse of the geographical distance of each municipality to the capital of the respective 
district, which is then our variable D in (3). This means that a decrease in that distance 
increases its inverse and therefore would increase efficiency if the estimated coefficients 
for such variable were positive. We report in Tables 8, 9 and 10 the results from the 
censored normal Tobit regressions for several alternative specifications of equation (3) 
for each of the five regions plus overall estimations for the entire country (mainland).  
 
The results indicate that spending efficiency is positively and strongly related to the 
percentage of inhabitants with either secondary or tertiary education, across most 
regions and specifications, including the specification for the mainland (right-hand 
panel of Table 10). Furthermore, both variables had the same (positive) sign and were 
significant at 1 per cent level at least once, which indicates, firstly, that an increase in 




relevant impact on the efficiency of municipal provision. The only exception is the 
Algarve region, but one must bear in mind that this region has a much small number of 
DMUs, which limits the accuracy of the results. 
 
Table 8 – Censored normal Tobit results: Alentejo and Algarve  
 
 Alentejo  Algarve 
  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 














Y  0.003 * 
(1.83) 
      -0.001 
(-0.33) 













   














Pdens   
 
   -0.003 
(-1.45) 
   
Nº  obs.  43  43 43 43 15 15 15 
ε σ ˆ   0.157  0.155 0.152 0.151 0.189 0.197 0.197 
 
Notes: Y – purchasing power; Esec – Population with secondary education; Eter – Population with tertiary 
education; D – distance to capital of district, inverse; PopDens – population density. The z statistics are in 
brackets. *, **, *** - Significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.  ε σ ˆ  – Estimated standard 
deviation of ε. 
 
Table 9 – Censored normal Tobit results: LVT, Norte 
 
 LVT  Norte 
  1 2 3 4 5  6  7 














Y  0.002 ** 
(2.44) 
   0.005  *** 
(6.45) 
    
Esec   0.010  ** 
(2.51) 




   0.013  ** 
(2.97) 













 8.77E-5  *** 
(2.60) 
 
PopDens       1.55E-4  ** 
(3.61) 
 7.21E-5  ** 
(2.17) 




Nº  obs.  48 48 48 82 82  82  82 
ε σ ˆ   0.106 0.177 0.178 0.160 0.168  0.151  0.149 
 
Notes: Y – purchasing power; Esec – Population with secondary education; Eter – Population with tertiary 
education; D – distance to capital of district, inverse; PopDens – population density; PopVar – population 
variation. The z statistics are in brackets. *, **, *** - Significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level 




Table 10 – Censored normal Tobit results: Centro, Mainland 
 
 Centro  Portugal  (Mainland) 
  1 2 3 4 5  6  7 














Y  0.003 *** 
(3.38) 












      
Eter 
 






D   -0.642 
(-0.82) 
       
PopDens      -1.042 
(-1.30) 








   0.002  *** 
(3.00) 
Nº obs.  78  78  78  78  278 278  278 
ε σ ˆ   0.164 0.165 0.166 0.164 0.119  0.116  0.115 
 
Notes: Y – purchasing power; Esec – Population with secondary education; Eter – Population with tertiary 
education; D – distance to capital of district, inverse; PopDens – population density; PopVar – population 
variation. The z statistics are in brackets. *, **, *** - Significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level 
respectively.  ε σ ˆ  – Estimated standard deviation of ε. 
 
For the purchasing power exogenous factor, used to assess whether richer local 
residents impose an increased pressure in demanding more efficient local services, the 
estimation results show positive and significant coefficients for all regions apart from 
Algarve.  
 
It is also worthwhile mentioning that the estimates for population density revealed 
positive and significant coefficients for the Norte region and for the Mainland, 
indicating that a higher proportion of inhabitants living in dense settlement structures 
may facilitate the organization and consumption of networked local services. For all the 
other regions, this variable is not relevant in explaining inefficiencies. Population 
growth has a positive effect on efficiency also only for the Norte region and for the 
Mainland. 
 
Finally, we found positive and statistically significant estimates for the coefficient of the 
geographical distance variable for the Alentejo, Algarve, and Norte regions. Hence, for 
those three regions, the closer the municipalities are to the capital of district the higher 




Centro region of for the mainland. Interestingly, geographical distance impinges 
negatively on efficiency in the case of the LVT region, the more densely populated 
region (see Table 1), which includes the country’s capital. In other words, for this 




In this paper we evaluated public expenditure efficiency of Portuguese municipal 
governments in 2002, using Data Envelopment Analysis to compute input and output 
efficiency scores for the 278 Portuguese municipalities located in the mainland. The 
analysis is performed by clustering municipalities into the five “regions” defined for 
statistical purposes according to the Portuguese nomenclature of territorial units with 
desegregation level II (NUTS II): Norte, Centro, Lisboa e Vale do Tejo (LVT), Alentejo 
and Algarve. 
 
To implement our frontier analysis we computed a so-called Local Government Output 
Indicator (LGOI) as a single measure of municipal performance, and used this 
composite indicator as our output measure for the DEA computations. Such composite 
indicator, also computed on a country (mainland) basis, includes sub-indicators of 
municipal services provision in the following areas: social services; education; cultural 
services; sanitation; territory organisations; and road infrastructures. 
 
The results of the DEA calculations show that average regional input efficiency scores 
range from 0.237 in the Centro region to 0.654 in the Alentejo region. On the other 
hand, average regional output efficiency scores are between 0.353 in the Centro region 
and 0.681 in the Algarve region. On a municipal level, the evidence is naturally quite 
unequal, which implies that there is significant room for improvement in terms of 
possible theoretical efficiency gains. Regarding the five regions, as well as for the 
mainland model, the number of municipalities that define the efficiency frontier is 
between three and four. 
 
Allowing for the separate use in the analysis of the output sub-indicators for the 




average it would be possible to attain the same level of output with roughly 43 per cent 
less of resources. Since the corresponding average output efficiency score is 0.788, a 
possible conclusion is that with the resources used, municipalities are on average 
producing some 21 per cent less in terms of public services than one would theoretically 
expect. Therefore, efficiency could be improved without necessarily increasing 
municipal spending. Additionally, under such model, and as one should expect, the 
number of municipalities that define the production possibility increases to twenty 
eight. 
 
In order to see what factors may impinge on the efficiency level of municipal services 
provision, we performed a Tobit analysis both for each region and also for the 
mainland. Regarding the possible explanatory variables of inefficiencies in the 
provision of local governments’ services, the most relevant non-discretionary factors, 
which contribute positively to increase efficiency, seem to be: the level of education, 
either secondary or tertiary; municipal per capita purchasing power; and geographical 
distance. 
 
Finally, one has to mention that these results should be put into some perspective, 
essentially because of two reasons. Firstly, the fact that some municipalities are not 
located on the theoretical production possibility frontier, and therefore not being 
labelled efficient, does not mean that they could actually be on the frontier. Indeed, 
municipal policy decisions may simply favour a different set of output provision. 
Secondly, the environmental factors, as discussed before, are a possible strong 














Appendix 1 – Detailed values for the LGOI measure 
 
Table A1.1 – Local Government Output Indicator (LGOI): Alentejo, Algarve, LVT 
Alentejo Algarve  LVT 
Municipality LGOI Municipality  LGOI Municipality LGOI 
Aljustrel                                0.84  Albufeira                               1.08  Alcobaça                                 0.80 
Almodôvar                              1.34  Alcoutim                                0.67  Bombarral                                0.78 
Alvito                                   1.04  Aljezur                                  1.11  Caldas da Rainha                      0.89 
Barrancos                               1.10  Castro Marim                          1.14  Nazaré                                   1.00 
Beja                                     1.43  Faro                                     1.49  Óbidos                                   0.81 
Castro Verde                          1.04  Lagoa                                    1.03  Peniche                                  0.73 
Cuba                                     1.40  Lagos                                    1.07  Alenquer                                 0.76 
Ferreira do Alentejo                1.07  Loulé                                    1.35  Amadora                                  0.75 
Grândola                                1.09  Monchique                              1.65  Arruda dos Vinhos                      1.12 
Mértola                                  0.84  Olhão                                    0.68  Cadaval                                  0.96 
Moura                                   0.98  Portimão                                0.94  Cascais                                 0.99 
Odemira                                 1.32  São Brás de Alportel               0.89  Lisboa                                   3.49 
Ourique                                 1.02  Silves                                   0.80  Loures                                   0.80 
Santiago do Cacém                1.18  Tavira                                   0.65  Lourinhã                                 0.65 
Serpa                                    0.88  Vila do Bispo                           0.76  Mafra                                   1.12 
Sines                                    0.94  Vila Real de Santo António     0.70  Odivelas  0.74 
Vidigueira                              0.92      Oeiras                                   1.07 
Alandroal                               0.87      Sintra                                   1.52 
Alcacér do Sal                        1.25      Sobral de Monte Agraço             1.35 
Arraiolos                               0.63      Torres Vedras                            1.07 
Borba                                    0.88      Vila Franca de Xira                     0.90 
Estremoz                                0.97      Abrantes                                 0.69 
Évora                                    1.70      Alcanena                                 1.06 
Montemor-o-Novo                   1.21      Almeirim                                 0.67 
Mora                                     0.77      Alpiarça                                 0.93 
Mourão                                  0.75      Azambuja                                 0.50 
Portel                                   0.61      Benavente                                0.79 
Redondo                                 0.66      Cartaxo                                  0.69 
Reguengos de Monsaraz       0.78      Chamusca                                 0.64 
Vendas Novas                        0.77      Constância                               1.92 
Viana do Alentejo                   0.91      Coruche                                  2.18 
Vila Viçosa                             0.71      Entroncamento                           0.96 
Alter do Chão                          1.14      Ferreira do Zêzere                      0.96 
Arronches                               0.92      Golegã                                   0.97 
Avis                                     0.68      Ourém                                    0.92 
Campo Maior                          0.84      Rio Maior                                0.83 
Castelo de Vide                      1.73      Salvaterra de Magos                   0.66 
Crato                                    1.32      Santarém                                 0.93 
Elvas                                    0.93      Sardoal                                  2.07 
Fronteira                               0.79      Tomar                                    0.79 
Gavião                                  0.86      Torres Novas                             0.73 
Marvão                                  1.35      Vila Nova da Barquinha              0.95 
Monforte                                0.96      Alcochete                                0.61 
Nisa                                     0.82      Almada                                   1.37 
Ponte de Sôr                           1.05      Barreiro                                 0.74 
Portalegre                              0.95      Moita                                    1.01 
Sousel                                   0.79      Montijo                                  0.61 
        Palmela                                  1.14 
        Seixal                                   1.02 
        Sesimbra                                 0.76 
        Setúbal                                  0.91 
Average 1.00  Average 1.00  Average  1.00 
Min (Portel)  0.61  Min (Tavira)  0.65  Min (Azambuja)  0.50 
Max (Castelo de Vide)  1.73  Max (Monchique) 1.65  Max  (Lisboa)  3.49 








Table A1.2 – Local Government Output Indicator (LGOI): Centro, Norte 
Centro Norte 
Municipality  LGOI  Municipality  LGOI  Municipality  LGOI  Municipality  LGOI 
Águeda                           0.87  Sabugal                          0.82  Arouca                             0.65  Vila do Conde                 1.01 
Albergaria-a-Velha          0.77  Seia                                0.84  Castelo de Paiva              0.61  Vila Nova de Gaia           1.84 
Anadia                            0.69  Trancoso                         0.82  Espinho                            1.06  Arcos de Valdevez          0.70 
Aveiro                             2.92  Alvaiázere                       0.73  Oliveira de Azeméis         1.01  Caminha                         1.00 
Estarreja                         0.73  Ansião                             0.91  Santa Maria da Feira       0.97  Melgaço                          1.19 
Ílhavo                              0.85  Batalha                           0.89  São João da Madeira       1.53  Monção                           0.69 
Mealhada                        0.94  Castanheira de Pêra       0.88  Vale de Cambra               0.72  Paredes de Coura          1.55 
Murtosa                           0.84  Figueiró dos Vinhos        0.89  Amares                            0.60  Ponte da Barca               0.69 
Oliveira do Bairro            1.35  Leiria                               2.15  Barcelos                           1.20  Ponte de Lima                1.17 
Ovar                                1.57  Marinha Grande              1.08  Braga                              1.89  Valença                           1.45 
Sever do Vouga              0.83  Pedrógão Grande           1.14  Cabeceiras de Basto       0.59  Viana do Castelo            1.28 
Vagos                             0.88  Pombal                           1.31  Celorico de Basto            0.55  Vila Nova de Cerveira     1.68 
Belmonte                        0.58  Porto de Mós                  0.91  Esposende                       1.01  Alijó                                 0.74 
Castelo Branco               1.20  Mação                             1.27  Fafe                                  0.88  Boticas                           0.99 
Covilhã                            0.85  Carregal do Sal               0.79  Guimarães                       1.61  Chaves                           1.07 
Fundão                           1.11  Castro Daire                   0.78  Póvoa de Lanhoso           0.58  Mesão Frio                      1.19 
Idanha-a-Nova                0.92  Mangualde                      1.39  Terras de Bouro               0.64  Mondim de Basto           0.93 
Oleiros                            0.67  Mortágua                        0.90  Vieira do Minho                0.65  Montalegre                      0.98 
Penamacor                     0.72  Nelas                              0.89 
Vila Nova de 
Famalicão                   1.30  Murça                              0.78 
Proença-a-Nova             2.23  Oliveira de Frades          0.78  Vila Verde                        0.90  Peso da Régua               0.55 
Sertã                               0.71  Penalva do Castelo        1.08  Vizela  0.61  Ribeira de Pena              0.72 
Vila de Rei                      0.90  Santa Comba Dão          0.92  Alfândega da Fé              0.77  Sabrosa                          0.90 
Vila Velha de Ródão       0.87  São Pedro do Sul           0.89  Bragança                         2.03 
Santa Marta de 
Penaguião                 0.82 
Arganil                            1.13  Sátão                              0.64  Carrazeda de Ansiães     0.80  Valpaços                         0.73 
Cantanhede                    1.47  Tondela                           1.07 
Freixo de Espada à 
Cinta                 0.74  Vila Pouca de Aguiar      0.72 
Coimbra                          2.92  Vila Nova de Paiva         0.86  Macedo de Cavaleiros     0.83  Vila Real                         2.60 
Condeixa-a-Nova            0.60  Viseu                               1.68  Miranda do Douro            0.79  Armamar                         0.73 
Figueira da Foz               1.42  Vouzela                           0.92  Mirandela                         0.71  Cinfães                           0.62 
Góis                                0.99      Mogadouro                       0.65  Lamego                           0.67 
Lousã                              0.84      Torre de Moncorvo          1.45  Moimenta da Beira         0.66 
Mira                                 0.76      Vila Flor                            1.13  Penedono                       1.32 
Miranda do Corvo           0.59      Vimioso                            0.74  Resende                         1.14 
Montemor-o-Velho          0.78      Vinhais                             0.73 
São João da 
Pesqueira                    0.81 
Oliveira do Hospital        0.70      Vila Nova de Foz Côa      0.67  Sernancelhe                   0.75 
Pampilhosa da Serra      0.87      Amarante                         0.81  Tabuaço                          0.98 
Penacova                        0.72      Baião                                0.57  Tarouca                          1.38 
Penela                            0.81      Felgueiras                        0.84     
Soure                              0.71      Gondomar                        1.27     
Tábua                             0.80      Lousada                           0.65     
Vila Nova de Poiares      1.27      Maia                                 1.02     
Aguiar da Beira               0.90      Marco de Canaveses       0.95     
Almeida                           0.61      Matosinhos                      1.63     
Celorico da Beira            0.76      Paços de Ferreira            1.00     
Fig. Castelo Rodrigo       0.64      Paredes                           0.86     
Fornos de Algodres        0.91      Penafiel                            0.75     
Gouveia                          0.74      Porto                                3.44     
Guarda                            1.12      Póvoa de Varzim             1.24     
Manteigas                       1.23      Santo Tirso                      1.22     
Meda                               0.75      Trofa  0.43     
Pinhel                              0.67      Valongo                            0.82     
Average     1.00  Average      1.00 
Min (Belmonte)      0.58  Min (Trofa)      0.43 
Max (Coimbra)      2.92  Max (Porto)      3.44 










Appendix 2 – Detailed DEA results for the five regions 
 
Table A2.1  – DEA results, Alentejo: 1 input (spend. per capita, 2001), 1 output (LGOI) 
 
Input oriented  Output oriented  Municipality 
VRS  TE Rank VRS  TE Rank 
Aljustrel  0.718 18 0.493 34 
Almodôvar 0.537  35  0.777  9 
Alvito  0.429 42 0.601 21 
Barrancos  0.332 47 0.636 17 
Beja  0.896 6 0.844 5 
Castro  Verde  0.631 25 0.608 20 
Cuba  0.888 7 0.833 6 
Ferreira do Alentejo  0.672  20  0.627  19 
Grândola  0.563 30 0.635 18 
Mértola  0.559 32 0.489 35 
Moura 0.863  9  0.660  15 
Odemira  0.806 11 0.775 10 
Ourique  0.477 39 0.591 22 
Santiago do Cacém  1.000  1  1.000  1 
Serpa  0.722 17 0.516 30 
Sines  0.539 34 0.547 24 
Vidigueira  0.637 24 0.538 26 
Alandroal  0.563 31 0.507 31 
Alcácer do Sal  0.645  21  0.730  13 
Arraiolos  0.577 28 0.367 46 
Borba  0.774 14 0.517 29 
Estremoz  0.971 5 0.792 7 
Évora  1.000 1 1.000 1 
Montemor-o-Novo  0.729 16 0.710 14 
Mora  0.484 38 0.446 41 
Mourão  0.340 46 0.434 43 
Portel  0.495 37 0.354 47 
Redondo  0.624 26 0.386 45 
Reguengos de Monsaraz  0.642  22  0.456  39 
Vendas  Novas  0.775 13 0.453 40 
Viana do Alentejo  0.575  29  0.531  28 
Vila  Viçosa  0.819 10 0.443 42 
Alter do Chão  0.369  44  0.659  16 
Arronches  0.414 43 0.532 27 
Avis  0.457 40 0.393 44 
Campo  Maior  0.781 12 0.494 33 
Castelo de Vide  1.000  1  1.000  1 
Crato  0.553 33 0.767 11 
Elvas  0.641 23 0.544 25 
Fronteira  0.433 41 0.457 38 
Gavião  0.535 36 0.500 32 
Marvão 0.677  19  0.789  8 
Monforte  0.363 45 0.555 23 
Nisa  0.611 27 0.479 36 
Ponte de Sôr  0.886  8  0.735  12 
Portalegre  1.000 1 1.000 1 
Sousel  0.732 15 0.464 37 





Table A2.2 – DEA results, Algarve: 
1 input (spending per capita, 2001),  1 output (LGOI) 
 
Input oriented  Output oriented  Municipality 
VRS TE  Rank  VRS TE  Rank 
Albufeira 0.424  12  0.661  9 
Alcoutim 0.264  16  0.406  16 
Aljezur 0.419  13  0.677  7 
Castro Marim  0.339  15  0.691  6 
Faro 1.000  1  1.000  1 
Lagoa 0.544  8  0.656  10 
Lagos 0.459  11  0.664  8 
Loulé 0.607  7  0.862  4 
Monchique 1.000  1  1.000  1 
Olhão 1.000  1  1.000  1 
Portimão 0.656  6  0.614  11 
São Brás de Alportel  0.699  5  0.587  12 
Silves 0.924  4  0.750  5 
Tavira 0.497  10  0.415  15 
Vila do Bispo  0.393  14  0.467  13 
Vila Real de Santo António  0.504  9  0.447  14 


































Table A2.3 – DEA results, LVT: 
1 input (spending per capita, 2001), 1 output (LGOI) 
Input oriented  Output oriented  Municipality 
VRS TE  Rank  VRS TE  Rank 
Alcobaça 0.837  8  0.511  17 
Bombarral  0.713 13 0.448 26 
Caldas da Rainha  1.000  1  1.000  1 
Nazaré  0.678 19 0.546 13 
Óbidos  0.384 46 0.295 43 
Peniche  0.660 22 0.398 32 
Alenquer  0.578 26 0.377 33 
Amadora  0.667 21 0.412 31 
Arruda dos Vinhos  0.499  35  0.481  20 
Cadaval  0.679 18 0.528 15 
Cascais  0.521 33 0.448 27 
Lisboa  1.000 1 1.000 1 
Loures  0.698 14 0.453 25 
Lourinhã  0.515 34 0.297 42 
Mafra  0.493 37 0.477 22 
Odivelas  0.696 15 0.418 30 
Oeiras  0.525 31 0.481 21 
Sintra  1.000 1 1.000 1 
Sobral de Monte Agraço  0.591  25  0.635  9 
Torres  Vedras  0.859 6 0.677 7 
Moita  0.859 7 0.645 8 
Vila Franca de Xira  0.738  11  0.529  14 
Abrantes  0.472 38 0.295 44 
Montijo  0.472 39 0.367 35 
Alcanena  0.374 47 0.275 47 
Almeirim  0.447 40 0.295 45 
Alpiarça  0.327 49 0.197 50 
Azambuja  0.425 42 0.373 34 
Benavente  0.540 30 0.363 37 
Cartaxo  0.628 24 0.189 51 
Chamusca  0.298 50 0.550 12 
Constância 0.269  51  0.981  4 
Coruche 0.974  4  0.556  11 
Entroncamento  0.733 12 0.465 23 
Ferreira  do  Zêzere  0.568 29 0.351 39 
Golegã  0.387 44 0.514 16 
Ourém  0.688 16 0.283 46 
Rio  Maior  0.353 48 0.365 36 
Salvaterra de Magos  0.674  20  0.488  19 
Santarém  0.631 23 0.593 10 
Sardoal  0.386 45 0.441 28 
Tomar  0.684 17 0.358 38 
Torres  Novas  0.569 27 0.462 24 
Vila Nova da Barquinha  0.569  28  0.270  48 
Alcochete 0.495  36  0.755  5 
Almada 0.742  9  0.261  49 
Barreiro  0.739 10 0.435 29 
Palmela  0.524 32 0.507 18 
Seixal  0.920 5 0.715 6 
Sesimbra  0.431 41 0.303 41 
Setúbal  0.413 43 0.350 40 




Table A2.4 – DEA results, Centro: 1 input (spending per capita, 2001) and 1 output 
(LGOI) 
 
Input oriented  Output oriented  Input oriented  Output oriented  Municipality 
VRS TE  Rank  VRS TE Rank 
Municipality 
VRS TE  Rank  VRS TE  Rank 
Águeda  0.263  15  0.298  40  Sabugal  0.159 56 0.281 50 
Albergaria-a-Velha 0.273  13  0.264  58  Seia  0.156 57 0.288 48 
Anadia  0.290  9  0.246  67  Trancoso  0.231 28 0.281 51 
Aveiro  1.000  1  1.000  1  Alvaiázere  0.166 53 0.250 65 
Estarreja  0.250  19  0.250  64  Ansião  0.222 35 0.312 31 
Ílhavo  0.210  40  0.291  44  Batalha  0.278 12 0.307 35 
Mealhada  0.185  44  0.322  26  Castanheira  de  Pêra  0.099 75 0.301 39 
Murtosa  0.185  45  0.288  46  Figueiró dos Vinhos  0.122  66  0.305  36 
Oliveira do Bairro  0.176  48  0.462  10  Leiria  0.751  3  0.834  4 
Ovar  0.457  6  0.648  6  Marinha  Grande  0.232 27 0.370 20 
Sever do Vouga  0.205  41  0.284  49  Pedrógão Grande  0.126  64  0.390  16 
Vagos  0.324  8  0.338  24  Pombal  0.252 18 0.449 11 
Belmonte  0.225  32  0.199  78  Porto de Mós  0.289  10  0.323  25 
Castelo  Branco  0.227  30  0.411  15  Mação  0.141 60 0.435 13 
Covilhã   0.215  37  0.291  45  Carregal do Sal  0.241  22  0.271  54 
Fundão  0.257  16  0.380  19  Castro  Daire  0.231 29 0.267 56 
Idanha-a-Nova  0.109  70  0.315  27  Mangualde  0.264 14 0.476  9 
Oleiros  0.142  59  0.229  71  Mortágua  0.151 58 0.308 34 
Penamacor  0.100  74  0.247  66  Nelas  0.213 38 0.305 37 
Proença-a-Nova  0.364  7  0.764  5  Oliveira de Frades  0.129  63  0.267  57 
Sertã  0.225  33  0.243  68  Penalva do Castelo  0.213  39  0.370  21 
Guarda  0.225  34  0.308  32  Santa  Comba  Dão 0.235 23 0.315 28 
Vila de Rei  0.124  65  0.298  41  São Pedro do Sul  0.162  55  0.305  38 
Vila Velha de Ródão  0.086  77  0.387  17  Sátão  0.235  24  0.219  74 
Arganil  0.180  47  0.503  8  Tondela  0.234 25 0.366 22 
Cantanhede  0.242  21  0.384  18  Vila Nova de Paiva  0.134  62  0.295  43 
Coimbra  1.000  1  1.000  1  Viseu  0.460 5 0.634 7 
Condeixa-a-Nova  0.186  43  0.205  76  Vouzela  0.182 46 0.315 29 
Figueira da Foz  1.000  1  1.000  1  Average 0.237    0.353  
Góis 0.117  68  0.339  23          
Lousã 0.175  49  0.288  47           
Gouveia 0.174  50  0.260  59          
Mira 0.166  52  0.202  77          
Miranda do Corvo  0.257  17  0.267  55          
Montemor-o-Velho 0.233 26 0.240 70          
Oliveira do Hospital  0.243  20  0.298  42          
Pampilhosa da Serra  0.108  72  0.255  62          
Penacova 0.288  11  0.277  52           
Penela 0.163  54  0.253  63          
Soure 0.226  31  0.243  69          
Tábua 0.205  42  0.274  53          
Vila Nova de Poiares  0.107  73  0.435  12          
Aguiar da Beira  0.109  71  0.308  33          
Almeida 0.136  61  0.209  75          
Celorico da Beira  0.087  76  0.260  60          
Fig. Castelo Rodrigo  0.017  78  0.219  73          
Fornos de Algodres  0.111  69  0.312  30          
Manteigas 0.167  51  0.421  14          
Meda 0.220  36  0.257  61          




Table A2.5 – DEA results, Norte: 1 input (spending per capita, 2001) and 1 output 
(LGOI) 
 
Input oriented  Output oriented  Input oriented  Output oriented  Municipality 
VRS TE  Rank  VRS TE  Rank
Municipality 
VRS TE  Rank  VRS TE  Rank
Arouca  0.699  27  0.320  45  Vila do Conde  0.464  53  0.309  46 
Castelo de Paiva  0.471  50  0.204  81  Vila Nova de Gaia  0.749  22  0.740  8 
Espinho  0.437  58  0.308  47  Arcos de Valdevez  0.446  56  0.219  72 
Oliveira de Azeméis  0.676  28  0.449  26  Caminha  0.491  48  0.324  44 
Santa Maria da Feira  0.743  23  0.478  21  Melgaço  0.233  85  0.346  40 
São João da Madeira  0.645  32  0.576  15  Monção  0.434  59  0.210  79 
Vale de Cambra  0.733  25  0.367  38  Paredes de Coura  0.522  42  0.469  23 
Amares  0.605  36  0.258  58  Ponte da Barca  0.477  49  0.231  66 
Barcelos  0.870  9  0.698  11  Ponte de Lima  0.604  37  0.452  25 
Braga 1.000  1  1.000  1  Valença  0.511  43  0.442  27 
Cabeceiras de Basto  0.658  31  0.276  53  Viana do Castelo  0.735  24  0.589  14 
Celorico de Basto  0.465  52  0.182  86  Vila Nova de Cerveira  0.364  68  0.488  20 
Esposende  0.638 33  0.424  31  Alijó  0.455 55  0.234  64 
Fafe  0.788 18  0.469  22  Boticas  0.276 81  0.288  50 
Guimarães  0.854 10  0.783  6  Chaves  0.663 30  0.462  24 
Póvoa de Lanhoso  0.593  38  0.245  60  Mesão Frio  0.343  72  0.346  41 
Terras de Bouro  0.397  63  0.186  85  Mondim de Basto  0.357  71  0.270  54 
Vieira do Minho  0.494  47  0.227  68  Montalegre  0.341  74  0.285  51 
Vila Nova de Famalicão  0.871  8  0.724  9  Murça  0.307  79  0.227  69 
Vila Verde  0.716  26  0.433  30  Peso da Régua  0.496  46  0.194  83 
Vizela  1.000  1  1.000  1  Ribeira de Pena  0.273  82  0.209  80 
Alfândega da Fé  0.391  65  0.224  71  Sabrosa  0.421  60  0.262  57 
Bragança  0.618  34  0.619  13  Santa Marta de Penaguião 0.383  66  0.238  62 
Carrazeda de Ansiães  0.290  80  0.233  65  Valpaços  0.445  57  0.226  70 
Freixo de Espada à Cinta  0.224  86  0.215  75  Vila Pouca de Aguiar  0.499  45  0.250  59 
Macedo de Cavaleiros  0.393  64  0.241  61  Vila Real  0.913  5  0.913  5 
Miranda do Douro  0.342  73  0.230  67  Armamar  0.318  78  0.212  78 
Mirandela  0.608 35  0.301  48  Cinfães  0.771 20  0.351  39 
Mogadouro  0.325 77  0.189  84  Lamego  0.569 39  0.268  56 
Torre de Moncorvo  0.330  76  0.422  32  Moimenta da Beira  0.464  54  0.216  74 
Vila  Flor  0.400 62  0.328  43  Penedono  0.266 84  0.384  37 
Vimioso  0.272 83  0.215  76  Resende  0.569 40  0.418  34 
Vinhais  0.420  61  0.213  77  São João da Pesqueira  0.363  69  0.235  63 
Vila Nova de Foz Côa  0.359  70  0.195  82  Sernancelhe  0.336  75  0.218  73 
Amarante  0.784 19  0.440  28  Tabuaço  0.383 67  0.285  52 
Baião  0.663 29  0.269  55  Tarouca  0.469 51  0.401  35 
Felgueiras 0.826  13  0.504  18  Average 0.567    0.393  
Gondomar 1.000  1  1.000  1         
Lousada 0.795  15  0.389  36         
Maia 0.507  44  0.340  42         
Marco de Canaveses  0.793  16  0.501  19         
Matosinhos 0.762  21  0.704  10         
Paços de Ferreira  0.790  17  0.521  16         
Paredes 0.908  6  0.641  12         
Penafiel 0.800  14  0.435  29         
Porto 1.000  1  1.000  1         
Póvoa de Varzim  0.536  41  0.420  33         
Santo Tirso  0.897  7  0.754  7         
Trofa 0.844  11  0.301  49         
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Annex – Data sources 
 
Table 1 – Input (X) and output variables (Y) (used in the construction of the LGOI), and 
respective sources 
 
Variable Input  measure 
 
Data Source 
X  Total municipal expenditures per 
inhabitant, 2001. 
INE, 2001: Recenseamento Geral da População e 
Habitação - 2001 (Resultados Definitivos); “Finanças 










Social services  
 
- Local inhabitants with  ≥ 65 years old, in 
percentage of the total resident population, 2001. 
INE, 2001: Recenseamento Geral 
da População e Habitação - 2001 
(Resultados Definitivos). 
 
Y2  Education  - School  buildings per capita measured by the 
number of nursery and primary school buildings 
in percent of the total number of corresponding 
school-age inhabitants (Y21), 2001; 
- Gross primary enrolment ratio, the number of 
enrolled students in nursery and primary 
education in percent of the total number of 
corresponding school-age inhabitants (Y22), 
2001. 
Anuários Estatísticos Regionais 
(CD-ROM) 2001-2003. INE; INE, 
2001: Recenseamento Geral da 




Number of library users in percentage of  the 
total resident population, 2001. 
Anuários Estatísticos Regionais 
(CD-ROM) 2001-2003. INE; 
INE, 2001: Recenseamento Geral 
da População e Habitação - 2001 
(Resultados Definitivos). 
 
Y4  Sanitation  - Water supply, 1000 m
3 (Y41); 
- Solid waste collection, tons (Y42). 
Anuários Estatísticos Regionais 




- The number of licences for building 
construction, 2001. 
Anuários Estatísticos Regionais 
(CD-ROM) 2001-2003. INE. 
 
Y6 Roads 
infrastructures   
- The length of roads maintained by the 
municipalities per number of the total resident 
population, 1998. 


















Table 2 – Non-discretionary variables (Z) and respective sources 
 
Variable Description  Data  Source 
Z1 
 
Y- Purchasing power   Portuguese National Institute of Statistics (2002). 
Z2  Esec – Population with 
secondary education 
INE, 2001: Recenseamento Geral da População e Habitação - 
2001 (Resultados Definitivos). 
Z3  Eter – Population with 
tertiary education 
INE, 2001: Recenseamento Geral da População e Habitação - 
2001 (Resultados Definitivos). 
Z4  D – distance to capital 
of district, inverse; 
Portuguese Geographical Institute (2005). 
 
Z5  PopDens – population 
density; 
INE, 2001: Recenseamento Geral da População e Habitação - 
2001 (Resultados Definitivos). 
Z6  PopVar – population 
variation. 
INE, 2001: Recenseamento Geral da População e Habitação - 
2001 (Resultados Definitivos); INE, 1991: Recenseamento Geral 
da População e Habitação - 1991 (Resultados Definitivos). 
 
 
 